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Abstract 
 
What does it mean to say that a theory represents the targeted phenomenon that it 
aims to explain? Our interpretation of “representation” is closely related to the 
methodological position that we would adopt in answering the question of realism in 
science. As is pointed out by Nancy Cartwright, according to the traditional syntactic 
approach of explaining scientific theorization, the question of realism is about how 
accurately the sciences can represent the world; in the semantic approach, however, 
the focus of the question shifts to a concern about the range of science—i.e., how 
much of the world the sciences can represent. This shift in the methodological concern 
is by no means trivial; it indicates that there is a change of content in the concept of 
representation from a static idea to a dynamic one. The static idea of representation 
concerns how reliably the formal structure of a class of sentences—i.e., the formal 
structure of a theory—can stand for the targeted phenomenon. The dynamic idea, 
however, perceives a theory as a class of models and explores the development of 
these models; that is, the dynamic idea of representation investigates how a theorizer 
uses these models to stand for reality. As a consequence of this shift from a static to a 
dynamic mode of thinking, it seems that model-building constitutes the main content 
of the concept of representation. By comparing two differing contemporary accounts 
of the nature of economic models and presenting a case study in economic theorizing, 
this paper argues that representation is a process of economists’ repeatedly using 
“realistic representation of the isolated unrealistic world” at each step of their 
theorizing to build up a class of “unrealistic constructed credible worlds.” 
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I. Introduction 
What does it mean to say that a theory represents the targeted phenomenon that it 
aims to explain? Our interpretation of “representation” is closely related to the 
methodological position that we would adopt in answering the question of realism in 
science. As is pointed out by Nancy Cartwright (1999), the usual philosophical topic 
of realism in science is about how accurately the sciences can represent the world; but 
her focus of the question shifts to a concern about the range of science—i.e., how 
much of the world the sciences can represent. This shift in the methodological concern 
is by no means trivial; it indicates that there is a change of content in the concept of 
representation from a static idea to a dynamic one. 
What then does it mean to say that the concept of representation is a static idea? 
According to the traditional syntactic, or orthodox, approach of explaining scientific 
theorization, a theory is conceived as a set of sentences—or, more precisely, a set of 
hypotheses—which are expressed in terms of first-order predicate logic and constitute 
a network of hypotheses. In this sense a theory is a logical structure that includes the 
most abstract hypotheses—the so-called axioms, which are expressed solely in 
theoretical terms—along with those hypotheses that are the logical deductive 
consequences of the axioms and are expressed in both theoretical and observational 
terms. Within this structure, there is also a set of correspondence rules that help make 
connections, through various stages, between the theoretical terms and the so-called 
topsoil of experience; and the anchoring points of these connections are the geneses of 
the meaning of the entire theoretical structure. The idea of “a theory representing what 
we see the world” that is captured by this description is a static idea, because it 
concerns how reliably, at a particular point in the development of a theory, the formal 
structure of a class of sentences—i.e., the formal structure of a theory—as a whole 
can stand for the targeted phenomenon in the world. 
What then is a dynamic idea of representation? According to the semantic 
account of scientific theorization, a theory is still regarded as an object containing a 
class of hypotheses that together account for the targeted phenomenon of the world; 
however, these hypotheses are not conceived, as in the syntactic approach, as 
free-standing propositions located in the logical structure of a theory. Instead, each of 
these hypotheses is regarded as being derived from a specific concrete environment 
indicated by the theory. If we regard each specific concrete environment as a model, 
then each hypothesis is said to be derived from this model and to be true of it. From 
this perspective, a theory can thus be regarded as comprising a class of component 
models, each of which is used to represent the corresponding part of the targeted 
phenomenon. The idea of representation manifested in this description of a theory is a 
dynamic idea, because its focus is no longer a matter of investigating whether a theory 
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as a whole at a particular time reliably represents the targeted phenomenon; rather, its 
focus is a matter of examining the long-range development of theorizers’ practice of 
using a class of models to stand for a class of corresponding parts of the phenomenon; 
that is, its focus is on examining how much of the world the theory can represent. 
As a consequence of this shift from a static to a dynamic mode of thinking, it 
seems that model-building constitutes the main content of the new concept of 
representation; but the immediate question is, How should we characterize 
model-building? Are there any competing philosophical accounts of the nature of 
model-building? The question is important, because different answers may result in 
different interpretations of the new concept of representation. By comparing two 
differing contemporary accounts of the nature of economic models—one proposed by 
Nancy Cartwright, and the other by Robert Sudgen—and presenting a case study of 
economic theorizing in international trade theory, this paper argues that, by combining 
the most characteristic features of Cartwright’s and Sudgen’s ideas about economic 
models, representation can be regarded as a process of economists’ repeatedly using 
“realistic representation of the isolated unrealistic world” at each step of their 
theorizing to build up a class of “unrealistic constructed credible worlds.” 
 
II. Two Ideas of Economic Modeling: Isolationists or Fictionalists? 
In January 2009, the journal Erkenntnis published a special issue titled “Economic 
Models as Credible Worlds or as Isolating Tools?”. Because this journal is a very 
important one in analytical philosophy, this publication indicates that the model-based 
approach—which was applied and further developed by philosophers of economic 
methodology in the middle of the 1980s in conducting the meta-theoretical discussion 
of economic theorizing—has been accepted by the analytical philosophers as a 
pioneering topic in mainstream philosophical discussion. Philosophers of economic 
methodology who have adopted the model-based approach have reached consensus 
that the gap between a theory and the fact it aims to explain—i.e., the issue of realism 
in theory—should not be dealt with from the perspective of hypothesis-testing but, 
instead, by model-building. 
In spite of this accord, however, there is still disagreement among those 
philosophers about the role or function of economic models—i.e., what feature or 
characteristic they contain—that makes them credible in providing a meta-theoretical 
account of the issue at hand. The main objective of the publication of the special issue 
was to clarify the nature of economic models by comparing and discussing two 
competing positions. One view is held by fictionalists, and one of their representative 
scholars is Robert Sudgen, an economists. Supporters of the other position are called 
isolationists, and Nancy Cartwright, a philosopher of science and economics, is their 
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representative scholar. 
According to the fictionalists, from the perspective of the practice of economic 
theorizing, economic models are “credible but counterfactual worlds.” What does 
“counterfactual” mean in this context? For fictionalists, the worlds depicted by the 
models are parallel to the actual world; and if these parallel worlds have any features, 
these features do not necessarily correspond to any relevant features of the actual 
world because these features are derived from constructed fictional worlds; these 
fictional worlds are obviously different from the actual world, and so these features 
correspond solely to the features of the fictional worlds but not at all to features of the 
actual world. Thus, the fictional features are regarded as counterfactual. 
What then does “credible” mean? When economists deal with practical 
economic problems and are consulted by governments for policy advice, the 
fictionalists suppose that notwithstanding the counterfactual nature of the constructed 
fictional worlds, these worlds are still parallel worlds to the actual world and therefore 
credible sources for economists to use in constructing tips and advice for tackling 
targeted economic problems. In other words, according to the fictionalists, economists 
clearly understand that the hypotheses derived from their models are suitable only for 
describing the features of the models, but they are confident in supposing that these 
features can still help them, to a certain degree, to deal with practical economic 
affairs. 
Why are economists so confident in this belief? The key point is that they think 
they can conduct reliable inductive inferences on the basis of various criteria—such as 
similarity, salience, credibility, and so on—that they derive from the comparing the 
relevant features of these two kinds of worlds (Sudgen 2009, p. 4). For example, 
Sudgen himself applies the concept of similarity--which was originally proposed by 
Ronald Giere to explain the similarity between a model and the actual world—as a 
tool to explicate how economists’ confidence is derived and established. 
Just as Giere did, Sudgen characterizes a theory as an entity comprising a class 
of models and a set of hypotheses that connect these models to the systems of the 
actual world; Sudgen also, like Giere, uses the case of Newtonian mechanics as an 
example to explicate this idea. According to Giere, the Newtonian theory contains a 
family of models; for each model in the family, there is a common general schema 
that states that force equals mass multiplied by acceleration. One model in the family 
is about the two-particle gravitational system, in which force is related to distance and 
mass by the Newtonian inverse square function. The relative motion between two 
particles, which is derived from this model, is a property of this model and is not 
presumed to correspond to any property of the actual world. But this model contains a 
hypothesis stating that the relative motions between Earth and the moon are very 
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similar to those of the particles in the model; it is this hypothesis that connects the 
model to a system in the actual world. Is this connection adequate? To answer that 
question we must further consult other relevant empirical evidence to determine 
whether the hypothesis is well supported. In other words, as for the question of 
whether the Newtonian laws of motion, which are derived from the two-particle 
model, also hold in the planetary motions, the answer will depend on whether 
scientists can discover evidence in which the interaction of two planetary objects 
indeed follows what is depicted in the laws of motion. (Sudgen 2009, pp. 16-17) 
By this example, Sudgen argues that, according to his observation, economists 
possess the same ideas and follow the same procedures as physicists do in their 
theorizing; that is, economists possess the same ideas concerning the general structure 
of a theory, and they follow the same procedures for constructing theoretical models 
and testing hypotheses that are derived from the models; but, as with physicists, 
economists do not presume that features derived from the theoretical models 
correspond to any features of the actual world. Instead, the validity of the 
correspondence must be judged by whether the hypothesis connecting the two 
systems—the models and the world—is found to be supported by the relevant 
empirical evidence. Consequently, unlike the isolationists, who characterize 
model-building as a work of “deducing the effects of known laws in controlled or 
idealized real-world systems,” Sudgen maintains that “a model is a construction, not a 
stripped-down description of the world” and that what economists are doing by 
model-building is “investigating the properties of a model,” and that’s it—no more 
and no less. (Sudgen 2009, p. 17) As for comparing the similarity of the features of 
the actual world and those of the fictional world, that task belongs to the work of 
inductive inference and is not a part of the work of model-building. 
Contrast Sudgen’s view with the view of the isolationists, who assert that a 
model is an isolating tool that is used to isolate the targeted economic phenomenon 
from other possible disturbing factors. As is maintained by Cartwright, this isolation is 
what allows economists to identify the reason that possesses the capacity to cause the 
targeted phenomenon. From this perspective, we can say that when economists 
investigate the various properties of a theoretical model, they, at the same, also 
investigate those various properties of the targeted phenomenon that is represented by 
the model. For isolationists, a model is not a full-fledged representation of the 
targeted phenomenon; instead, it represents the most salient features of the 
phenomenon. Cartwright offers the example of 2005 Nobel laureate Thomas 
Schelling’s famous checkerboard model of segregation to illustrate how the patterns 
of exertion of the capacity of a cause are formed in a model. (Cartwright 2009, pp. 
46-47) 
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In Schelling’s model, black and white checkers represent, respectively, the black 
and white citizens (or any two different ethnic groups) in a U.S. community. Initially, 
these checkers are distributed randomly, with some spaces left empty on the board; 
the way these checkers are placed represents the initial way that the black and white 
citizens are dispersed in an actual community. Suppose that these checkers—or 
citizens—can move freely on the board except that they must obey the following rule 
(or preference): that they “desire not to live in a neighborhood where they are badly 
outnumbered.” Surprisingly, the deduced result is that checkers of the same color—or 
citizens of the same ethnic group—tend to gather together to form obvious segregated 
areas, although no one prefers to live in a segregated neighborhood. 
According to Cartwright, Schelling’s model can be regarded as a minimal model 
within which there is only one factor that carries the causal power, or capacity, that 
enables the model to produce the aforementioned result. The capacity that leads the 
hypothetical simple society to tend toward the segregated result is the preference of 
the agents in the model—i.e., the preference “not to live in a neighborhood where 
their own group is heavily underrepresented.” Cartwright maintains that although the 
knowledge of the preference’s capacity cannot completely reflect all the aspects of an 
actual society, it nevertheless represents an important aspect of the phenomenon of 
segregated communities in a complex society. 
The main reason that the knowledge of capacity can represent an important 
feature of a targeted phenomenon is that, by using the technique of 
assumption-manipulation, the knowledge is derived from a disturbance-free 
environment; as a result, the derived outcome is regarded as a piece of information 
that reflects what the causal factor would exert with its full causal power (or capacity). 
Therefore, this element of the derived knowledge of the capacity of citizens’ common 
preference can thus be used by economists as a foundation or as valuable information 
to construct an explanation for the segregation that occurs in an actual 
community—even though the actual phenomenon is a result of the operation of a 
great number and variety of causal factors. 
Based on the fictionalist and isolationist positions, our immediate question is 
this: Is there a significant difference in their ways of characterizing an economic 
model? For Cartwright, who is an isolationist, the answer is no. Cartwright analyzed 
all of Sudgen’s cases of economic modeling to illustrate his view that economic 
theorizing is nothing more than an activity of constructing counterfactual but credible 
models. Cartwright concludes that Sudgen shows two things: first, that there are in a 
counterfactual world some specific factors that are supposed to be the causes of that 
world’s features, and, second, there is a specific way that those factors interact to 
produce the targeted features of the world. According to Cartwright’s reinterpretation, 
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what Sudgen calls “counterfactual worlds” are in fact what she calls the “isolated 
environments” of hypothetical models; therefore, Cartwright asserts, Sudgen’s 
practice is in fact applying models as isolating tools to explore what might happen in 
the actual world. Following Cartwright’s alternative interpretation, it may seem that 
Cartwright aims to resolve the debate between the fictionalists and isolationists by 
redefining a model as an isolated environment or an isolated experiment. (Cartwright 
2009, p. 53-54) 
But is Cartwright’s mediating work successful? It may not seem so, because the 
focal point of the debate between the fictionalists and the isolationists is to define the 
nature of an economic model, and Cartwright simply replaces the fictionalist idea 
with her isolationist idea, which is squarely contradictory to the fictionalist position. It 
may thus seem that Cartwright’s mediating work is not only out of focus but also a 
futile attempt to communicate that would not be welcomed and accepted by the 
opposing party. 
What then would an acceptable mediatory proposal look like? One of the main 
features of such a proposal is that it should start with finding common ground that 
would be accepted by the two parties. It may seem that Margaret Morrison and Mary 
Morgan’s classic idea about the nature of models—that models are autonomous 
mediators between theories and the world—would be an ideal starting point. But 
before we move on to discuss how Morrison and Morgan’s idea can help us to find a 
possible resolution for the debate, in order to have a more solid background for our 
discussion let us first take a look on a case of economic theorizing in international 
trade theory. 
 
III. A Case Study: The Pattern of International Trade and the Leontief Paradox 
Our case study focuses on the pattern of international trade. The classical theory of 
international trade argues that the determinants of international trade are based on 
specific technological differences between nations. By contrast, the neoclassical 
theory asserts that these determinants are found simultaneously in the differences 
between the technologies, the available quantities of factors of production (i.e., factor 
endowments), and the tastes of different nations. However, by assuming identical 
production functions and tastes (i.e., the same technological level and taste between 
different nations), the modern Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model—the 
mainstream model of neoclassical tradition—attributes these determinants solely to 
the differences between the factor endowments of different nations. 
 This loss in degree of generality is, according to some authors (Gandolfo 1987, p. 
I.5), the price that must be paid if one wishes to obtain specific conclusions about the 
structure of a nation’s international trade. These conclusions, which were produced by 
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an attempt to predict the pattern of trade on the basis of the observable characteristics 
of the pre-trade autarkic equilibria, can be summarized in the following two 
propositions (Chacholiades 1978, pp. 205-6): 
1.  The cause of international trade is to be found largely in differences between the 
factor endowments of different nations. In particular, a nation has comparative 
advantage in the production of—and will export—commodities that use more 
intensively the nation’s more abundant factor. This proposition is known as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. 
2.  International trade tends to equalize factor prices between nations and thus 
substitutes, to some extent, for factor mobility. This proposition is known as the 
factor-price equalization theorem. 
Let us focus on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem. Suffice it to say here that 
the H-O theorem asserts that the ultimate cause of international trade in goods lies in 
the differences between the available quantities of the producing factors, such as labor 
and capital, of different nations. The main reason is that differences in factor 
endowments will give rise to international variations in comparative costs of 
production which in turn give rise to international trade of goods. Therefore, 
according to the H-O theorem, the upshot of a nation’s international trade will be that 
a nation will have comparative advantage in producing and exporting commodities 
that use more intensively the nation’s more abundant producing factor. For example, if 
a nation has comparatively more capital than any other producing factor, the nation 
will benefit more from producing and exporting commodities that use more capital.  
Therefore, such a capital-abundant country will tend to produce and export 
capital-intensive commodities. 
Apparently, as mentioned earlier, the H-O theorem is a conclusion that is 
derived from a highly simplified model; thus, its validity depends on certain factual 
background knowledge that remains to be analyzed. Accordingly, any attempt to 
derive specific empirical implications directly from this proposition without referring 
to the model’s background assumptions would be dubious. 
Indeed, the H-O theorem was generally accepted until the results of the first 
serious empirical test challenged its validity (Leontief 1954). Leontief demonstrated 
that the United States, the most capital-abundant country in the world, exported 
labor-intensive commodities and imported capital-intensive commodities. This 
unexpected result, which seemed to contradict the prediction of the H-O theorem, 
became known as the Leontief Paradox. 
The Leontief Paradox stimulated enormous amounts of empirical and theoretical 
research that aims to explain this anomalous phenomenon. Among the explanations 
that have been put forth, one is worth noting for our purpose: B. S. Minhas’s studies 
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(1962, 1963) of the empirical validity of the assumption of strong 
factor-intensity—i.e., the study of the relaxation of commodity’s strong 
factor-intensity assumption and its consequence of the commodity’s factor intensity 
reversal phenomenon. 
The main idea behind Minhas’s studies is as follows: Suppose that there are only 
two kinds of goods in our economy—capital-intensive goods and labor-intensive 
goods—and there are only two producing factors in our economy—capital (K) and 
labor (L)—that are used for producing these two goods. Now suppose that the price of 
capital (rent) becomes relatively cheaper than the price of labor (wage); i.e., the 
rent-wage ratio (rent/wage) decreases. As a result, the producers in both industries are 
willing to substitute the relatively-cheaper capital for the relatively-more-expensive 
labor in their production. The idea of factor intensity reversals is as follows: If the 
amount of capital (the relatively more expensive producing factor) that producers of 
labor-intensive goods substitute for labor (the relatively cheaper producing factor) 
changes the intensity ratio (capital/labor) of labor-intensive good to a certain degree 
that is greater than the new intensity ratio of capital-intensive good, which is resulted 
from the substitution of capital for labor by producers of capital-intensive goods; the 
factor intensity reversal occurs because the original labor-intensive goods become 
capital-intensive goods. In other words, because of a change in the relative factor 
price, the rate of substitution of the relatively cheaper factor—in our case, 
capital—for the relatively more expensive factor—in our case, labor—in the 
labor-intensive good industry is greater than that in the capital-intensive good industry; 
and this difference in the substitution rate of producing factor between two industries 
is so substantial that it is sufficient to change the original factor-intensity 
classification of the commodity produced in labor-intensive good industry relative to 
that of the commodity produced in capital-intensive good industry. 
Let’s see how the notion of factor intensity reversal contributes to the 
explanation of the Leontief Paradox. We know that, according to the H-O theorem, in 
a two countries-two producing factors-two commodities model, when a country is a 
capital-abundant country, it has a comparative advantage in producing and exporting 
capital-intensive goods because the cost of capital (i.e., rent) becomes cheaper relative 
to that of the other countries in the world. However, at the same time, the cheaper 
price of capital will not only cause producers of capital-intensive goods to increase 
the intensity of use of capital in producing capital-intensive goods, but it will also 
induce the producers of labor-intensive goods to substitute the relatively cheaper 
capital for the relatively-more-expensive labor in the course of their production.  
This action will change the intensity ratios of these two goods in this capital-abundant 
country. When the intensity ratio of labor-intensive goods (i.e., (K/L)l) is greater than 
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that of capital-intensive goods (i.e., (K/L)k), at the new factor price level the original 
labor-intensive goods become capital-intensive goods and the original 
capital-intensive goods become labor-intensive goods.  Therefore, after the factor 
intensity reversals, this capital-abundant country will produce and export 
labor-intensive goods and thus exhibits the Leontief Paradox. 
The example is important because it exhibits a case of common cause. The 
difference in factor endowments has the dual power to cause a country to export two 
different commodities with different factor intensities. In our example, on the one 
hand, the abundance of a country’s capital (D) will enable the country to have a 
comparative advantage (A) in producing capital-intensive goods and exporting them 
(C). On the other hand, the abundance of capital will also cause the relative prices of 
factors to differ and will thereby cause the producers in both industries to substitute 
the relatively cheaper producing factor for the relatively expensive one and the 
substituting action may trigger factor intensity reversals (R). After factor intensity 
reversals, this capital-abundant country will produce and export labor-intensive goods 
(L) and therefore exhibits Leontief Paradox. The causal path is shown in the following 
(Figure 1), where t1, t2, and t3 represent the time sequence:  
 
          D  •           t1 
 
         A  •     •  R           t2 
 
        C •        •  L      t3 
        
Figure 1: Dual Causal Power of the Abundance in Capital (D) 
 
The main point of the case study for our purposes is that, to take the view from a 
meta-theoretical perspective, note that if we regard the original H-O theorem as a 
hypothesis that is used to describe a certain feature of international trade in a specified 
world, then we can say that this hypothesis—i.e., the H-O theorem—is true of the 
hypothetical world—i.e., is true of this specified world, and let us call this 
hypothetical world the H-O model. So, when Minhas offers his factor-intensity 
reversal explanation of the Leontief Paradox, Minhas is actually using a reformulated 
model to explain an anomalous phenomenon that happened in the actual world that 
the old model cannot explain or predict. That is, by dropping the assumption of the 
strong factor-intensity, Minhas creates a revised version of the H-O model, a version 
that is obtained by consulting the original theory that was proposed in the early 
twentieth century by two pioneers of modern international trade theory, Eli F. 
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Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin—let us call the theory the H-O theory—and can then be 
used to explain or predict the Leontief Paradox—i.e., can then be used to 
accommodate the originally anomalous actual phenomenon. From this perspective, 
we can say that when the result of Leontief’s empirical study shows that the H-O 
theorem founders, this information can be fed back to economists as a clue to help 
them manipulate a rearrangement of the theoretical model that can then be used to 
explain or predict—i.e., to accommodate—the originally unexplainable or 
unpredictable phenomenon. In other words, in our case, it means that Minhas now has 
a new causal model that can be used to represent the new status of the similar 
phenomenon in the actual world. 
 
IV. Models as Autonomous Mediators between Theories and the World 
I mention in Section II that, as is pointed out by Morrison and Morgan, models can be 
regarded as autonomous mediators between theories and the world; and I presume that 
this idea of models is generic enough to encompass both Sudgen’s and Cartwright’s 
ideas and so will be accepted by them. Thus it can be used to resolve the debate 
between them. Let us use our example to explain why it is so. 
When we regard models as mediators between theories and the world, we mean 
that models are autonomous of both their relevant theories and the world. What does 
“autonomous” mean in this context? According to Morgan, it means that models are 
“halfway houses, formed to capture the correspondence between theory and data [i.e., 
the world],” and she adds that models are “needed to satisfy both sides.” (Morgan 
1988, p. 208) How can models satisfy both sides of theory and the world? Hsiang-Ke 
Chao, after reviewing Morgan’s position, points out, “At one extreme, there are 
theoretical models which are not measurable. At the other extreme, there are measured 
data. Since theoretical models are not proper tools for empirical investigations, we 
need some kind of measurable or empirical models to do the task. Empirical models 
are not just those which are derived from data, but those which are measurable and 
estimable so that they match both theoretical and empirical properties.” (Chao 2009, p. 
5) 
Based on Morrison and Morgan’s generic idea about models, let us recap what 
Sudgen says. According to the fictionalist perspective, theoretical models are credible 
but counterfactual worlds that are parallel to the real world. Not all the characteristics 
of the fictional worlds of models correspond to those of the real world, but this defect 
does not prevent economists from regarding models as credible parallel worlds that 
function as important references consulted by economists when they are asked to 
provide policy advice. The reason that economists have such confidence in the 
information gleaned from fictional worlds is that they do not accept the information as 
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being reliable unless they are assured that there is a sufficient degree of similarity 
between the structures of the two worlds. For fictionalists, a model is a construction 
and not a stripped-down description of the real world. 
Let us also recall how Cartwright characterizes the nature of models: Cartwright 
maintains that, according to isolationists, theoretical models are isolation tools that are 
used to separate disturbing factors that may interfere with the occurrence of the 
targeted economic phenomenon. According to this idea, theoretical models are 
embodiments that simulate the most salient features of the real world. By repeatedly 
using this tool, economists acquire knowledge about the capacity of the posited cause 
of the most salient features of the targeted phenomenon. According to isolationists, 
the phenomena or properties manifested in models represent certain important or 
interesting aspects of the real world. 
Also recall that, in our case study, there is initially a hypothesis—the H-O 
theorem—which is derived from a highly restricted environment; in other words, 
economists initially have a highly idealized theorem that is derived from a model that 
is far from realistic in that it carries a class of assumptions that specify conditions 
very different from the conditions of the actual world. Let us call the H-O theorem an 
abstract theoretical claim. Admittedly, there is always a gap between an abstract 
theoretical claim and the real phenomenon it is intended to explain—such as the gap 
between the H-O theorem and the anomalous phenomenon of international trade (or, 
to be more precise, the anomalous phenomenon of the content of a country’s 
international trade). As long as we are theorizing something, such a gap always exists.  
It simply reflects the limit of the scientific method that we can apply. The genuine 
concern here, however, is not the existence of this gap. Rather, we should focus our 
concern, within the limit of the scientific method, on whether and in what way this 
gap can be reduced. This genuine concern in fact reflects Cartwright’s concern that I 
mention in the very beginning of this paper: The current concern of realism in science 
is not about how accurately the sciences can represent the world, but about the range 
of science—i.e., how much of the world the sciences can represent. 
If we regard the concern of the gap between an abstract theoretical claim and 
the real phenomenon it aims to explain as a question of how an abstract theoretical 
claim bears on the relevant real phenomenon, an immediate question is, Why should 
we bother with it? The answer is that we want to know whether an abstract theoretical 
claim can be used to explain a real phenomenon. A further question is, Why should 
we doubt that an abstract theoretical claim can do the job of explanation? The answer 
is that we know that an abstract theoretical claim is at best derived from a theoretical 
model whose structure singles out the main, but not all, causal features of the structure 
of the real world. Therefore, we know that any explanation made from an abstract 
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theoretical claim will not precisely correlate with the real phenomenon. This 
imprecision—let us call it the gap of abstractness—raises our doubts. 
In economics, the most often applied method to bridge the gap is the piecemeal 
method of assumption-manipulation, as we have seen in our study of Minhas’s case; 
this method involves the changing of the ideal theoretical assumptions—i.e., to relax 
the assumption of strong factor-intensity of a commodity—in the original theoretical 
model. At first sight, it may seem that the objective of the assumption-manipulation 
approach is simply to design a theoretical structure that can be used to derive the 
abstract theoretical claim—in our case, the H-O theorem—more smoothly; and it is 
also hoped that, by using the same approach, as many theoretical models as possible 
can be established so that there are more and more hypothetical worlds from which 
the same abstract theoretical claim can be derived; in other words, the abstract 
theoretical claim can thus be regarded as being true of these many hypothetical 
worlds. 
Recall the semantic explanation of scientific theorization I mention in the 
introduction of this paper, which states that the structure of a theory is constituted by a 
class of different models, and each model is used to derive a specific theoretical claim. 
To use the example in our case study, we can say that the H-O theorem, which is 
derived from the original H-O model, is a hypothesis that belongs to the H-O theory; 
and the theorem of the dual causal power of the abundance in capital, which is derived 
from the revised H-O model within which the assumption of strong factor-intensity is 
removed, is another hypothesis that is also a part of the H-O theory. Following a 
similar pattern, it is predictable that, by using the technique of 
assumption-manipulation, economists can produce as many theoretical models with 
different hypothetical structures as they wish so that they can derive as many 
theoretical claims as they wish; and these theoretical claims can be used to describe 
the features of these theoretical models from which they are derived. It may thus seem 
that we can conceive of a theory as a grand hypothetical world that contains a class of 
component hypothetical worlds—i.e., a class of theoretical models with different 
hypothetical structures—as its constituent parts. From this perspective, we may 
maintain that the practice of a theorist’s constructing a theoretical model to derive a 
theoretical claim can thus be interpreted as using a theoretical model to represent a 
relevant part of the grand hypothetical world. This interpretation can thus help to shed 
new light on interpreting Sudgen’s position: When Sudgen says that the worlds 
depicted by the models are parallel to the actual world and if these parallel worlds 
have any features, these features do not necessarily correspond to any relevant 
features of the actual world; what he means is that, according to our interpretation, 
these features derived from the models reflect simply the relevant features of the 
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grand hypothetical world that is depicted by the relevant theory. 
This further interpretation of Sudgen’s position illustrates the notion that the 
main concern of Sudgen’s fictionalist account of models is to focus on explicating the 
relation between a theory and its component models; therefore, it is no wonder that 
Sudgen expresses the following view: “[Theorists] typically say very little about how 
their models relate to the real world. It seems to be seen as sufficient to describe the 
properties of the model world in parallel with those of the real world, …The most 
natural interpretation of this practice is that, in the relevant scientific community, this 
counts as explanation.” (Sudgen 2009, p. 25, emphases original) 
But, again, should the purpose of changing the ideal theoretical assumptions in 
the piecemeal method be interpreted simply as intending to design a theoretical 
structure that can be used to derive the abstract theoretical claim more smoothly and 
thus be regarded as simply a theoretical practice or game conducted by theorists to 
investigate the relation between a grand hypothetical world and its component 
hypothetical worlds? It may not seem so. Sudgen again: “Perhaps a theorist is entitled 
to present a model in the hope that it will prove useful, without being able to say how. 
Still, a model cannot prove useful unless someone uses it, and whoever that person is, 
he or she will have to bridge the gap between model world and real world… if we 
then try to imagine how that model could be used, we find we need someone 
to…advance the hypothesis that some part of the real world works like the model. 
And if the model is supposed to give us confidence in that hypothesis, we are entitled 
to ask how it does so. There is still a gap to be crossed, and that requires inductive 
inference.” (Sudgen 2009, pp. 25-26) So even a fictionalist like Sudgen would still 
maintain that there is a gap to be crossed; in other words, he would still maintain that 
a model should somehow—surely, as mentioned in the quotation, Sudgen would 
suggest an inductive inferential approach—be proved to be useful in the sense that 
some part of the real world works like—or, is represented by—the model. Our 
question is, How can we rationally explain that Sudgen is still concerned about 
whether a model can adequately represent a certain part of the real world even though 
we know that Sudgen is a fictionalist who would care only about “the properties of 
the model world in parallel with those of the real world”? 
 
V. An Isolationist Account of How Abstract Theoretical Claims Can Be Relevant 
to the Real World 
To interpret Sudgen’s aforementioned seemingly contradictory position, the best 
strategy is to reconsider why economists conduct assumption-manipulation in their 
theorizing. It is first supposed that the purpose of using assumption-manipulation in 
economic theorizing is simply to set up as many theoretical models as possible so that, 
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from these different theoretical models, as many theoretical claims can be derived and 
can in turn be used to describe the features of these models; but contrary to this 
supposition, we might interpret the use of assumption-manipulation as trying to add 
more causal considerations to the original theoretical model. These causal 
considerations can result in changes in the ideal theoretical assumptions—changes 
such as dropping restrictive assumptions, revising the content of the original 
assumptions, or even adding new assumptions. The final choice of the changes 
depends on the real situation of each case to be explained. I mention these changes to 
point out that they reflect economists’ attempts to revise the causal structures of their 
theoretical models so that the revised models will be more pertinent to the real causal 
structure underlying the targeted real economic phenomenon. 
Economists conduct such revisions because they want to obtain more-accurate 
causal models that they can use to derive more-accurate causal laws that can in turn 
be used to explain the targeted economic phenomenon. If economists can somehow 
show that the revised theoretical model can produce a more accurate causal law, this 
fact will indicate that their attempt to de-abstract—i.e., to remove assumptions 
from—the original theoretical model is successful; moreover, the causal law derived 
from this de-abstracted theoretical model will be less abstract than the causal law 
derived from the original theoretical model. Furthermore, because the less abstract 
causal law must have been shown in some empirical test to be a more accurate causal 
law that can be used to explain the targeted phenomenon, it can be regarded as more 
relevant to the targeted real economic phenomenon. By showing this relevance, 
economists can reduce the gap of abstractness. And this also explains why Sudgen 
maintains that “there is still a gap to be crossed” and why remains concerned about 
whether a model can adequately represent a certain part of the real world. 
We may further illustrate that there is a connection between our causal 
interpretation of Sudgen’s position and Cartwright’s idea of the nature of economic 
models—i.e., the idea that models are isolating tools—by referring to our case study. 
Recall the H-O theorem: A country has a comparative advantage in producing and 
exporting those commodities that use more intensively the country’s relatively more 
abundant factors. This theorem is a highly abstract theoretical claim, because it is 
produced from a highly abstract theoretical model within which a long list of 
assumptions is added. As mentioned in Section II, this long list of assumptions is used 
to set up a disturbance-free environment to guarantee that the cause—the difference in 
factor endowments—has the capacity to determine the content of exported 
commodities. That is, the purpose of setting up this highly abstract model is to try to 
discover the essential behavior of the difference in factor endowments in determining 
the content of exported commodities. But, at the same time, this long list of 
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assumptions makes this theoretical model very unrealistic in the sense that the causal 
structure for producing this essential behavior is very different from the one within 
which the exported commodities of a specific country are determined. But, as is 
pointed out by Cartwright in her remark on Schelling’s checkerboard model of 
segregation, the knowledge of the capacity of a cause that is derived from a highly 
unrealistic model cannot completely reflect all the aspects of an actual society, but it 
nevertheless represents an important aspect of the targeted phenomenon in a complex 
society. 
It is no wonder, then, that Leontief found that this capacity claim foundered 
when it was used to explain the content of U.S. exports in 1947. The discrepancy 
between what the H-O theorem asserted and what Leontief found is an example of 
what we have called the gap of abstractness. Does this gap lead international trade 
theorists to abandon the H-O theorem outright, or do they simply ignore the gap? Do 
international trade theorists simply tolerate the gap of abstractness and not try to 
improve the situation? It seems not. The Minhas study that we discuss in Section III 
represents a theorist’s attempt to bridge the gap. 
Notice that, following Cartwright’s isolationist causal interpretation of the 
nature of economic models, Minhas’s study should not be interpreted as trying to 
revise the H-O model by simply doing theoretical tricks such as changing some 
theoretical assumptions to enable him to derive the desired theoretical conclusion 
more smoothly. On the contrary, Minhas’s study is also concerned with the problem of 
whether the causal structure of the theoretical model is consistent with the causal 
structure of the targeted real economic phenomenon—i.e., the problem of 
heterogeneous testing structures. 
Following this isolationist interpretation, we may assume that Minhas has a 
different idea regarding the Leontief Paradox. According to Minhas, the fact that the 
United States did not export the commodities predicted in the H-O theorem must arise 
from a discrepancy between the theoretical causal structure and the real causal 
structure. What is this discrepancy? Minhas notices that, in the real world, the 
factor-intensity of a specific commodity does not always stay the same. Depending on 
the ease of substituting one production-factor for another factor in an industry in 
response to a change in the prices of these production-factors, the factor-intensity of a 
commodity will reverse in the industry that allows easier factor substitution. If this 
factor-intensity reversal occurs, it can be used to explain the Leontief Paradox. But 
how can Minhas show that this concern is not an arbitrary guess? How can he show 
that factor-intensity reversal is a general feature of the real causal structure? Recall 
what Sudgen says: “There is still a gap to be crossed, and that requires inductive 
inference.” Minhas makes an inductive inference. 
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To show that factor-intensity reversal is a characteristic of the real causal 
structure, Minhas must show that, in most industries, factor-intensity reversal occurs.  
In an ingenious empirical test not mentioned earlier in this paper, Minhas indeed 
shows that factor-intensity reversal is a prevalent phenomenon. After Minhas showed 
that factor-intensity reversal is a general phenomenon in most industries in the United 
States, this phenomenon should be regarded as an additional causal consideration to 
be added to the original H-O model. Therefore, according to our causal interpretation, 
Minhas’s finding should suggest that one more causal factor should be included in the 
original H-O model, and the addition of this causal factor will be reflected in the 
dropping of the restrictive assumption of the strong factor-intensity in the H-O model. 
To mention Minhas’s practice is to point out that trade theorists do not care only 
about the ease of the derivability of their theoretical models; they are more concerned 
about whether the causal structures specified in their theoretical models are consistent 
with the real causal structure of the targeted real economic phenomenon. If the 
theorists’ causal structures are more complete than their previous versions, the causal 
laws derived from these more complete models will generally be more accurate than 
the ones derived from the old models. In any case, the derivation of more-accurate 
causal laws that can be used to explain real economic phenomena is the second 
concern in these theorists’ work. Constructing more-complete causal structures is their 
first theoretical concern. 
On the basis of our isolationist account of economic modeling, if we compare 
the H-O theorem and the result derived from Minhas’s study, it is obvious that the 
H-O theorem is more abstract than Minhas’s result with respect to the real 
phenomenon of the content of U.S. exported commodities in 1947. The reason is that 
Minhas’s result is readily applicable to explain Leontief’s Paradox, but the H-O 
theorem seems to be unhelpful or even provides a contradictory result. But note that 
this situation does not mean that the H-O theorem or the H-O model is useless or is 
empirically refuted. We must remember where Minhas’s result came from: not from 
the original H-O model but rather derived from a revised H-O model with the 
assumption of strong factor-intensity dropped. In other words, his result is derived 
from a more complete H-O model with a new causal factor—the factor-intensity 
reversal—added to the original theoretical causal structure. Although the final result 
derived from the revised H-O model is contradictory to what is asserted in the H-O 
theorem, this fact does not prevent us from regarding the H-O theorem as a general 
guideline that has shaped the general direction of the research of international trade in 
the past 70 years. The later empirical research into the modification of the original 
H-O model can be regarded as trying to fill up the phenomenal content of the H-O 
theorem. It is the persistent fact of economic theorists’ supplying the phenomenal 
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content to their abstract theoretical claims that gives us a reason to believe that the 
problem of the gap of abstractness is being reduced. 
Given that we can narrow the gap of abstractness by making the theoretical 
model or theoretical claim more causally realistic or concrete via supplementing more 
phenomenal content with respect to the targeted real phenomenon, we can form a 
rough guideline for determining the order of abstractness (or concreteness) between 
any two theoretical models. This guideline is as follows: If a theoretical model can 
provide a more complete causal structure than another theoretical model, the more 
complete theoretical model can be regarded as more concrete (or less abstract) than 
the other model. The corollary of this guideline is this: If a theoretical claim is derived 
from a more complete causal model, it will generally be a more accurate causal claim 
that can be used to provide a fuller causal explanation of the targeted real 
phenomenon. As a result, this more accurate causal claim can be regarded as more 
concrete (or less abstract) than the causal law derived from a less complete causal 
model. If we use this guideline, it is obvious that the revised H-O model—i.e., the 
model formulated by adding a new causal factor found in Minhas’s empirical 
study—is more concrete than the original H-O model. So the result derived from the 
revised H-O model is more concrete than the H-O theorem. 
By proposing the guideline for determining the order of abstractness (or 
concreteness) between any two theoretical models and the corollary of the positive 
relation between the accuracy of a causal claim and the completeness of a causal 
model, I complete the following three tasks: (1) the task of applying the isolationist 
idea of economic modeling to explain Sudgen’s seemingly contradictory position; (2) 
the task of analyzing an isolationist account of how abstract theoretical claims can be 
relevant to the real world; and (3) the task of illustrating that the main concern of 
Cartwright’s isolationist account of economic models is to focus on explicating the 
relation between models and the world—i.e., explicating how models access the 
actual world. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Representation as a Process of Model-Building 
Economic theorizing is an activity composed of two opposite processes: abstraction 
and concretization. When economists are interested in a specific class of repeated 
economic phenomena, they, like most theorists in other disciplines, start thinking 
about how to construct an account that will explain why this class of phenomena 
occurs repeatedly. They know that this class of repeated phenomena is probably not a 
result derived from the operation of any specific cause in an economic system; rather, 
they think that this class of phenomena is the result derived from the operations of 
countless causal factors in the system. But, at the same time, they also know that to 
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recognize the full list of these causal factors is not possible. 
To formulate an explanatory account that is manageable within their recognition 
limits, then, they assume that although countless causal factors are responsible for the 
occurrence of a class of phenomena, there often is a class of causal factors that 
constitutes a causal structure that can also produce the same class of repeated 
economic phenomena within some reasonable approximation. With this assumption, 
economic theorizing begins and a process of abstraction is triggered. When 
economists conduct their theorizing in this way, they are constructing what Sudgen 
calls counterfactual but credible worlds in their theoretical models. Note that these 
constructed worlds of the theoretical models are called counterfactual because they 
are set up under the aforementioned assumption; and they are regarded as credible 
because the theoretical conclusions derived from the causal structures of these 
counterfactual worlds, with respect to the actual targeted phenomena, are always 
within some reasonable approximation. 
This process of abstraction starts when economists begin to set up a theoretical 
model by abstracting from the real economic situation those causal factors that they 
think are most important. They then use these factors to lay out the causal structure 
that they think can represent the main causal features of the real causal system that 
produce the targeted real economic phenomena. Economists then use various ideal 
conditions, such as ceteris paribus clauses, to act as shielding devices—or as what 
Cartwright called isolating tools—to prevent the results derived from their models 
from suffering the disturbing influence of other, less important causal factors. The 
purpose of using these isolating tools is to ensure that the derived result is purely the 
exhibition of the essential behavior—i.e., the capacity—of this class of selected causal 
factors and nothing else. 
The conclusion derived from economists’ theoretical models must be very 
imprecise because, as we have mentioned, a theoretical model does not include all the 
causal factors. But this conclusion reflects economists’ first attempt to provide an 
explanation that captures or represents the main causal features of the targeted 
economic phenomena. This initial account is highly abstract and cannot explain every 
detail of the phenomenon. But as long as it can provide a general description of the 
most important causal features, it can be regarded as a general guideline and so be 
accepted as an economic explanation. 
Note that obtaining this general guideline is not the end of economic theorizing.  
A question often encountered in economic theorizing is this: Can such a general 
guideline be used to explain or predict other classes of economic phenomena? This 
question is critical, especially when economists are asked to provide policy 
suggestions based on their theoretical models. Is it reasonable for economists to 
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suggest, simply by using policy parameters suggested in a theoretical model based on 
the data of the past ten years, that a government reduce its money supply to a certain 
amount in order to fix the price level at a certain level in the next year? If the 
abundant factor of production in a country is capital, should the government of this 
country encourage its domestic manufacturers to focus on producing capital-intensive 
commodities in order to improve the welfare of these domestic makers simply 
because the government’s policy would exploit what Heckscher and Ohlin suggested 
in their famous theorem? 
Again, the concept of causal structure should figure in economic theorizing.  
The point is not whether or not these basic theoretical claims are correct; it is whether 
they are used in the same causal structure. We should not expect that a theoretical 
claim would be applicable within different causal structures. We can expect only that 
a theoretical claim can provide a general direction for our research. It is widely 
accepted that there is indeed a causal relation between money and price. But the point 
is in what way they are connected. The intuitive idea is that an increase in the supply 
of money will increase price levels. But it may, in the real world, turn out that an 
increase in the money supply, contrary to what is predicted in monetary theory, does 
not affect price levels at all. Should we simply refute the theoretical claim? No. This 
seemingly refuted theoretical claim should serve as a starting point to begin our 
search for a new causal structure. As is suggested in Minhas’s case, when the real 
phenomenon contradicts what is predicted in the H-O theorem, it is time for the 
process of concretization to begin. 
Just as Minhas’s study produced suggestions about the original H-O model, a 
new study of the relation between money and prices should also suggest which new 
causal factors—i.e., which new phenomenal contents—should be added to the 
original monetary model and what kind of new causal structure should be laid out in 
order to capture the real causal system of the new economic situation. If, at the end of 
a process of economic modeling, it can be shown that the new causal structure 
specified in the new theoretical model is indeed consistent with the real new causal 
system, then what is derived from this new theoretical model must be able to explain, 
predict, and represent the targeted real phenomenon. By completing this entire 
procedure, the original abstract monetary model is said to be concretized. 
In a review of his own thirty-year exploration of the issue of realism in 
economics, Uskali Mäki, a Finnish philosopher of economics, recollects on what he 
was brought into the study of the philosophy of economics. He was perplexed about 
why economists always use unrealistic models to discuss real economic affairs. He 
concluded that, for philosophers of economic methodology, the harshest challenge is 
to defend realism in economic science against the fact it is a prevalent practice among 
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economists to use unrealistic models to explain actual economic phenomena. (Mäki 
2009) After reviewing Sudgen’s and Cartwright’s accounts of the nature of economic 
models, Tarja Knuuttila, another new-generation Finnish philosopher of science, 
points out that we may summarize the ideas held by both camps as follows: For 
fictionalists, theoretical models are credible constructions; for isolationists, they are 
isolating representations. (Knuuttila 2009) 
Based on our case study, which examines how economists manipulate their 
assumptions to construct a new model with a new causal structure at each step of their 
theorizing, we may conclude by maintaining that, in economics, representation should 
be conceived as a dynamic idea. Economic theorizing (or economic explanation) is a 
process of repeatedly using “realistic representation of the isolated unrealistic world” 
(this part of the idea is motivated by Cartwright’s idea of models as isolating tools) at 
each step of economic theorizing to build up a class of “unrealistic constructed 
credible worlds” (this part of the idea is, however, derived from Sudgen’s idea of 
models as counterfactual but credible worlds). 
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